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An important aspect of daily life is the ability to infer information about the contents of 
ŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĐĂŶƐĞĞĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶ
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘dŚĞŽƌǇŽĨDŝŶĚ ? ?dŽD ? ?WĂƐƚ
research has shown that adults with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) often show deficits 
in social communication abilities, although can successfully pass tests of explicit ToM. The 
current study utilized a computerized false-belief task to explore subtle differences (i.e., 
measuring response times and accuracy rates) in how efficiently ToM capacities  W 
specifically, belief-attribution  W are utilized in adults with and without ASD. In the task, 
participants were asked to attribute a belief-state to either themselves or another person, 
following establishment of a true or false-belief scenario. Results revealed comparable 
patterns of ToM engagement across individuals with and without ASD, with faster and more 
ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽ ‘^ĞůĨ ?ǀĞƌƐƵƐ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ?ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ  ?ĂŶĚƐůŽǁĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŝŵĞƐ
ǁŚĞŶƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ‘^ĞůĨ ?ĂŶĚ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽǁŚĞŶŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂ
perspective. However, autistic individuals showed a particular deficit in correctly identifying 
a belief-state in false-belief trials, in which two contrasting belief-states had to be held in 
mind, suggesting more difficulty disengaging from current, reality based belief-states than 







To successfully communicate, we have to think about what other people do/do not know; 
ƚŚŝƐŝƐĐĂůůĞĚŚĂǀŝŶŐĂ ‘dŚĞŽƌǇŽĨDŝŶĚ ? ?dŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇůŽŽŬĞĚĂƚŚŽǁǁĞůůƉĞŽƉůĞƵƐĞƚŚĞŝƌ
Theory of Mind when thinking about the ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚƐ ?ZĞƐƵůƚƐƐŚŽǁĞĚƚŚĂƚ
people with autism had difficulties considering more than one mental state at a time, 
suggesting they may have more trouble in stopping themselves thinking about what is 
happening in reality than people without autism. 
 
 
Key Words: Theory of Mind; False-Belief; Belief-Attribution; Perspective-Taking; Autistic 
Spectrum Disorders  





Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to compute and attribute mental states to both 
oneself and other people. This includes ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞƐ
ŵĂǇĐŚĂŶŐĞĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞƐŵĂǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĂƚ
any given point in time (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, 
& Cohen, 2000; Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). ToM serves 
a very social function, allowing individuals to successfully communicate, both verbally and 
non-verbally, by attributing meanings and motivations to the things that people may say or 
do, and allowing individuals to distinguish between different behaviours, such as goal-
oriented versus non-goal oriented actions, ensuring appropriate responses to different 
scenarios are produced (Baron-Cohen, 2001; Frith & Frith, 2012; Wellman, 1990). Deficits in 
dŽDĐĂŶŚĂǀĞƐĞǀĞƌĞƌĞƉĞƌĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĂďŝůƚǇƚo relate to other people socially; 
for instance, difficulties in spontaneously and readily assessing what another person may or 
may not know can lead to difficulties in deciding what information needs to be explicitly 
stated, and what information is already known by a conversational partner, to ensure 
successful exchanges of information (Leslie & Frith, 1988; Kuroda et al., 2011; Ponnet, Buysse, 
Roeyers, De Clercq, 2008). In turn, these struggles in social interactions can lead to isolation 
and issues with depression, anxiety, and stress as a direct result of failure to engage in 
 ‘ŵŝŶĚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?ĂƌŽŶ-Cohen, 2001; Kim et al., 2000; Strang et al., 2012).  
 
Prior studies have shown that in young children with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD), 
development of ToM abilities is often delayed, with children with ASD failing tests of first-
order belief-understanding that are passed by their typically developing peers (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Hutchins, Prelock, & Bonazinga, 2011; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; 
Swettenham, 1996). However, recent research has suggested that in older individuals with 
ASD, ToM task abilities are less clear, with some studies finding that high-functioning ASD 
individuals are able to pass advanced tests of ToM (e.g., Bowler, 1992; Happé, 1994; Ozonoff, 
Pennington, & Rogers; 1991; Ponnet et al., 2008). In this paper, we examined belief-
attribution abilities, a component of ToM, in adults with and without ASD. The study advances 
previous research by exploring how efficiently adults with and without ASD could attribute 
beliefs both to themselves and other people, and how efficiently individuals can switch 
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between their own and soŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƐrequired during social interactions in 
daily life. 
 
Theory of Mind in Childhood 
 
The American Psychiatric Association (2013) describes ASD as relating to difficulties in 
engaging in social communication, reduced eye contact, and an egocentric focus when 
engaging in conversations, alongside repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Deschrijver, Bardi, Wiersema, & Brass, 2016; Gökçen, 
Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016). Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) proposed that difficulties in social 
interactions in individuals with ASD may reflect deficits in ToM. To assess ToM abilities in 
children, studies often utilize a false-belief paradigm in which children are required to predict 
ĂĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽƌƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŝŶĂƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽwhere ƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ƐŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŽǁŶŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). For instance, in a classic unexpected contents paradigm, the 
 ‘^ŵĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?dĂƐŬ ?WĞƌŶĞƌ ?>ĞĞŬŵĂŶ ? ?tŝŵŵĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?children are shown a familiar packet of 
ƐǁĞĞƚƐ  ? ‘^ŵĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ĂŶĚ Ăsked what they think is inside the tube. On answering with 
 ‘ĐŚŽĐŽůĂƚĞ ?Žƌ ‘ƐǁĞĞƚŝĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĞƌreveals that the tube actually contains a pencil; the 
pencil is re-hidden and the Smarties tube resealed. Children are then asked two critical test 
questions assessing their ToM abilities: what they themselves thought was inside the tube 
before seeing inside (self-oriented belief-attribution), and what another person, who has not 
seen inside the tube, would think was inside (other-oriented belief-attribution). To 
successfully pass these questions, children need to understand that their current knowledge 
state (that there is a pencil in the Smarties tube) differs from both their own prior mental 
state, and also from a naive person ?Ɛ false-belief that the tube contains chocolate. Results 
with typically developing (TD) children have reliably shown a developmental shift between 
the ages of 3-4 years old, with rapid improvements in abilities seen from 4-years on, with 
children able to identify both their own prior belief states and the current belief state of 
another person. In contrast, prior to this age, TD children tend to incorrectly attribute their 
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐƚĂƚĞďŽƚŚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂŶĚĂůƐŽƚŽƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ‘I always thought 
ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂƉĞŶĐŝůŝŶƚŚĞƚƵďĞ ?) (Callaghan et al., 2005; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Hogrefe, 
Wimmer, & Perner, 1986; Perner et al., 1987; Wellman et al., 2001). However, in children with 
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ASD, results have shown that this emergence of false-belief understanding is delayed, with 
children continuing to fail the critical test questions until much later ages (Baron-Cohen, 2001; 
Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1995; Happé, 1994; Hutchins et al., 2011; Swettenham, 1996; 
Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez, & Walsh, 1996).  
 
dŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂƐƐĞƐƐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐdŽDĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?tŝůůŝĂŵƐĂŶĚ,ĂƉƉé (2009 ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚĞ ‘WůĂƐƚĞƌƐ ?
task, akin to the Smarties task but removing the need for participants to verbalise their belief-
state prior to the creation of a false-belief. In the plasters task, children witness an 
experimenter injure their finger; the experimenter then asks the child to pass them a 
plaster/band-aid. The child is presented with three different boxes to choose from, only one 
of which is a plasters box. By selecting the correct box, children demonstrated their belief 
that the box contained plasters, without needing to verbalise this belief. Once the plasters 
box was selected, children were shown that it actually contained birthday candles 
(unexpected contents). On resealing the box, children with and without ASD were asked 
questions akin to those used in the Smarties task, assessing self-oriented and other-oriented 
belief-attributions. Interestingly, results revealed that, without the scaffolding of a previously 
spoken utterance, children with ASD showed a specific impairment in their ability to answer 
self-oriented probe questions, finding them more difficult than the other-person test 
questions (Williams & Happé, 2010; Williams, 2010). These results suggest that self-oriented 
and other-oriented belief-attributions are dissociable (although likely closely related) 




Theory of Mind in Adults 
 
Despite evidence suggesting deficits in ToM abilities in individuals with ASD during childhood, 
studies have suggested that once children with ASD develop sufficient verbal abilities, they 
are able to pass tests of advanced ToM, ultimately reaching ceiling levels on ToM tasks that 
include binary responses (e.g., sweets/pencils in the Smarties task; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Perner et al., 1987; Peterson, Slaughter, & Paynter, 2007; Scheeren, de Rosnay, Koot, 
& Begeer, 2013). These findings suggest that older individuals with ASD are, at least to some 
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extent, in possession of ToM abilities, in that they are able to pass tasks requiring 
consideration of contradictory mental states both of oneself and other people, under false-
belief task conditions. However, individuals with ASD are still found to experience and report 
significant social difficulties, arguably reflecting difficulties in inferring the contents of other 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚƐĂŶĚƵƐĞŽĨĂŶĞŐŽĐĞŶƚƌŝĐĨŽĐƵƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?Ğ ?g., Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001; Deschrijver et al., 2016; Gökçen et al., 2016; Laghi et al., 2016; Peterson, Garnett, 
Kelly, & Attwood, 2009; Scheeren et al., 2013). Given this, it has been suggested that to assess 
whether adults with ASD do experience deficits in ToM abilities, more sensitive measures of 
ToM capacities  W rather than pass/fail tasks  W are required to capture more subtle deficits 
within the ToM mechanism that may be present (Deschrijver et al., 2016; Gökçen et al., 2016; 
Scheeren et al., 2013). Addressing this, studies have explored differences in results when 
using explicit measures of ToM abilities (i.e., requiring overt responses), in which ToM 
capacities of individuals with ASD appear to be intact (e.g., Deschrijver et al., 2016; Roeyers, 
Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001; Scheeren et al., 2013), versus using implicit measures of ToM 
abilities (e.g., using eye-tracking to examine spontaneous looking behaviour), in which ToM 
abilities appear to be impaired in individuals with ASD compared to TD individuals (e.g., 
Gökçen et al., 2016; Happé, 1994; Kleinman, Marchiano, & Ault, 2001; Peterson et al., 2007; 
Schneider et al., 2013; Senju et al., 2009). 
 
Senju et al. (2009) explored differences in implicit versus explicit ToM task performance,  
recording eye-tracking measures whilst TD adults and adults with Asperger syndrome viewed 
videos of a puppet hiding a ball in one of two boxes, before an actor reached through one of 
two windows to retrieve the ball from the box. Before the actor grasped the ball, a true or 
false-belief scenario was created when the puppet moved the ball from its current location 
either whilst the actor was looking (true-belief) or whilst the actor was looking away (false-
belief). The false-belief scenario created the critical test trial, in which anticipatory looking 
was assessed. Results showed that neuro-typical adults anticipated thĞĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŽŶ
the basis of their false-belief, demonstrating a bias in looking towards the correct answer 
target (i.e., the now empty box that the actor believes contains the ball); in contrast, 
individuals with Asperger syndrome did not show any anticipatory looking towards the 
correct target window, although there was no significant difference in explicit ToM task 
performance between TD and ASD individuals. Results from Schneider, Slaughter, Bayliss, and 
BELIEF-ATTRIBUTION IN ADULTS WITH AUTISM 
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Dux (2013) further support these findings, demonstrating that, in a similar paradigm, there 
were no significant differences between performance of high-functioning ASD participants 
and TD participants on an explicit ToM measure, whilst implicit eye-tracking measures 
suggested that TD participants ǁĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇƚƌĂĐŬŝŶŐĂŶĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨ-states, but ASD 




In this paper, we sought to establish whether differences in ToM capacities between 
individuals with and without ASD could be captured when using a sensitive measure of explicit 
ToM capacities. The Self/Other Differentiation task (Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015; 
Bradford et al., 2018) measures response times and accuracy to assess conditions in which 
ToM is most efficiently utilized (as opposed to binary pass/fail measures), allowing detection 
of specific deficits in ToM that may be experienced by individuals with ASD (e.g., in reporting 
their own prior belief-states versus the belief-states of another person; Russell & Hill, 2001; 
Williams & Happé, 2009). The Self/Other Differentiation task is a computerized false-belief 
paradigm, developed for use with adult participants, and ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘^ŵĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?task 
methodology. Participants are asked to identify which container they or someone else would 
look inside for a particular item, before being shown expected or unexpected contents. They 
are ƚŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚǁŚĂƚĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇ ? ‘^ĞůĨ ? ?ŽƌƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ? ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? ?ǁŽƵůĚƚŚŝŶŬǁĂƐŝŶƐŝĚĞĂ
ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞƌ ?ŝĨƚŚĞǇŚĂĚŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŶŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?belief-attribution). Previous research has indicated 
that even in TD adults, who possess fully developed ToM capacities, an egocentric bias can 
be seen during interactions, with a failure to spontaneously consider the perspective of 
another person unless explicitly prompted to do so (e.g., Apperly, 2012; Birch & Bloom, 2004; 
Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Braunder, 2000; Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 2003; Samson, Apperly, 
ƌĂŝƚŚǁĂŝƚĞ ?  ? ŶĚƌĞǁƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ZĞƐƵůƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƌĂĚĨŽƌĚ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƐƚƵĚǇ ƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
Self/Other Differentiation task demonstrated that TD individuals were faster and more 
ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ Ăƚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚŚĂŶ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?
suggesting an egocentric bias in processing of scenarios, even though answers from both the 
 ‘^ĞůĨ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘KƚŚĞƌ ?ƉĞƌspective were identical (i.e., both believe there to be Smarties in the 
tube, before seeing inside). Moreover, there was a significant role of perspective-shifting, 
with participants finding it harder (taking longer and making more errors) when shifting from 
BELIEF-ATTRIBUTION IN ADULTS WITH AUTISM 
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ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƚŽƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽǁŚĞŶƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?Ɛ
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶ ?dŚĞƐĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶŝ ŶĞƵƌŽ-typical individuals, ToM 
can be engaged in a more/less efficient manner, depending on context.  
 
This paper utilized the Self/Other Differentiation task to assess whether, when using a 
sensitive explicit measure of ToM capacities, differentiations between the performance of TD 
individuals and individuals with ASD could be ascertained, specifically exploring how 
efficiently individuals with and without ASD could successfully attribute beliefs to both 
themselves and other people, and how efficiently individuals can switch between their own 
ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?It was predicted that ASD individuals would find the belief-
attribution task harder than TD individuals, showing longer response times and more errors 
overall. Further, if ASD individuals find mental state attribution per se difficult, we could 
expect that responses would show less differeŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘^ĞůĨ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘KƚŚĞƌ ?
perspectives, compared to TD individuals, reflecting an overall deficit in mental state 
attribution, rather than a deficit in belief-ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘^ĞůĨ ?Žƌ  ‘KƚŚĞƌ ?
perspective. If, however, ASD individuals experience a stronger bias towards an egocentric 
perspective (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Brent et al., 2004; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 
1992), we might expect ASD individuals to ƐŚŽǁĂůĂƌŐĞƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘^ĞůĨ ?ĂŶĚ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ?
oriented processing than TD individuals, with faster responses for ƚŚĞ ‘^ĞůĨ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĂŶ
ƚŚĞ  ‘KƚŚĞƌ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?It was also predicted that ASD individuals would show a particular 
deficit in trials requiring a perspective-shift between the self-perspective and the other-
perspective, reflecting difficulties in tracking the mental states of other people in 
conversation-like scenarios. Finally, it was predicted that both ASD and TD participants would 
show longer response times and more errors following false-belief trials than true-belief 






Sixty-two participants were recruited from the Autism Research at Kent (ARK) participant 
database, split into two groups: 32 neurotypical individuals and 30 individuals with Autistic 
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Spectrum Disorder. One participant with ASD was excluded from analysis due to an overall 
very low accuracy score (< 10%) in the Self/Other Differentiation task, suggesting a failure to 
engage with the task, leaving 29 participants in the ASD participant group. All participants 
were reimbursed for their time. All participants gave informed consent and this study was 
approved by the University of Kent Research Ethics committee. 
 
Participants were statistically matched for gender, age, and IQ (see Table 1). All participants 
had full-scale IQs greater than 70 (measured using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI); Wechsler, 2011), were over 18, native-English speakers, and did not have 
a diagnosis of dyslexia or reading comprehension impairment. Participants completed the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001), a 50-item self-report questionnaire that assesses ASD/ASD-like features; three 
neurotypical individuals were excluded from reporting of AQ results due to a failure to 
complete the questionnaire in its entirety. Individuals in the ASD group scored significantly 
higher than TD individuals on the AQ (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Mean (S.D.) demographic information of participants included in analysis 
 ASD (n = 29) TD (n = 32) t p 
Gender (m:f) 21:8 18:14 X2 = 1.72 .19 
Age (years) 30.41 (11.72) 30.22 (14.2) .058 .954 
Verbal Comprehension 103.28 (10.93) 105.19 (10.95) -0.68 .498 
Perceptual Reasoning 102.14 (18.09) 107.44 (12.31) -1.35 .183 
Full-Scale IQ 102.72 (14.30) 107.03 (10.97) -1.33 .190 
AQ*  29.90 (10.47) 17.71 (7.14) 4.08 < .001*** 
ADOS Module 4 (Severity Score) 6.73 (4.47) -   
*Note: for the AQ, three TD participants failed to complete the questionnaire in its entirety, and thus N = 29. 
 
 
Participants in the ASD group had all received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (N = 10), 
ƐƉĞƌŐĞƌ ?Ɛ^ǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ ?EA? ? ? ? ?ŽƌWĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞĞǀĞlopmental Disorder Not-Otherwise Specified 
(PDD-NOS; N = 1), according to DSM-V or ICD-10 criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013; World Health Organization, 1993), and diagnostic reports were verified by the 
researcher. Current ASD symptomology was assessed with Module 4 of the Autism Diagnostic 
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Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000; see Table 1 for mean score), which was 
administered and coded by a research-reliable trained researcher. ADOS scores were 
ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂƐĂŶŽǀĞƌĂůů ‘ƐĞǀĞƌŝƚǇƐĐŽƌĞ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚǁŽƐƵď-scales of communication and social 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? dǁŽ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ĚŝĂŐŶŽƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƐƉĞƌŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ^ǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ ĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ K^
assessment.  
 
Measures and Procedure 
 
The Self/Other Differentiation task, a computerized task assessing belief-attribution abilities, 
replicated the method described in Bradford et al. (2015; see also Bradford et al., 2018). 
Programmed using E-Prime software, the task consisted of 8 practice trials and 120 test trials 
(80 experimental trials and 40 distractor trials; see Table 2). All trials consisted of three stages: 
Dilemma Stage (establishing a belief-state) Æ Contents Revelation Stage (creating true/false 
belief scenarios) Æ Probe Stage (belief-attribution). Only test trials required belief-
attribution, with practice trials referring only to reality states  ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?  ‘What was in the 
ďĂĐŬƉĂĐŬ ? ?). Figure 1 illustrates the three stages of each trial. 
 
At the Dilemma Stage of the task, participants were asked to identify where either they (self-
oriented) or someone else (other-ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ ?ǁŽƵůĚůŽŽŬĨŽƌĂŶŽďũĞĐƚ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ? ‘ ?You are/Mark is] 
ďĂŬŝŶŐ Ă ĐĂŬĞ ĂŶĚ ŶĞĞĚ ?Ɛ ? ƐŽŵĞ ĞŐŐƐ ? tŚĞƌĞ ǁŽƵůĚ  ?zŽƵ ?DĂƌŬ ? ůŽŽŬ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŵ ? ?). This 
question was presented on screen for 1500ms before three image answer options were also 
displayed below this sentence, for a maximum of 5000ms. The answer options were 
presented horizontally, with one correct answer image and two incorrect answer images. 
Participants indicated their selection by pressing an arrow key corresponding to the spatial 
location of the object (left image Å ?ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝŵĂŐĞA? ?ƌŝŐŚƚŝŵĂŐĞÆ). If an incorrect selection 
ǁĂƐŵĂĚĞ ?ŽƌƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚŝŵĞůŝŵŝƚ ?ĂƌĞĚ ‘y ?ǁĂƐĚŝƐƉůĂǇĞĚĨŽƌ ? ? ? ?ŵƐ
before the Dilemma reset, until the correct answer option was selected.  
 
Following establishment of a belief-state at the Dilemma Stage, the Contents Revelation Stage 
manipulated true- or false-belief states of participants. The contents of the selected container 
were revealed to be either expected contents (i.e., true-belief) or unexpected contents (i.e., 
false-belief). This image was shown for 2000ms. No response was required from participants. 
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Following Self or Other oriented dilemmas, half of each were followed by 














Figure 1: Example of the trial structure used in the Self/Other Differentiation Task, illustrating how a 
trial would be seen in a Self or Other condition at the Dilemma and Probe stage, with examples of 
expected and unexpected content outcomes at the Contents Revelation stage. 
 
The final stage of each trial was the Probe Stage, in which participants saw a sentence asking 
them to attribute a belief-state to either themselves at a previous time point, or another 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ  ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?  ‘Before [you/Mark] saw what was inside, what did [you/he] think was in the 
box?). Answers were indicated by selecting one image from three presented horizontally, as 
in the Dilemma Stage. The Probe question was shown for 1500ms before the three answer 
options appeared. The image answer options were displayed until a response was given, or 
for a maximum of 8000ms if no response was recorded. Distracter questions (40) were also 
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞWƌŽďĞ^ƚĂŐĞ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ? ‘What colour was the egg box? ?) to reduce anticipation of a 
correct answer until the Probe Question was presented.  
 
dŚĞŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘^ĞůĨ ?ĂŶĚ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ?ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƚƌŝĂůƐ ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ
either no perspective shift (e.g., Self-Self, Other-Other) or there was a perspective-shift (e.g., 
Self-Other, Other-Self) across the Dilemma-to-Probe stage of each trial. Participants were 
instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to both the Dilemma and Probe 
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Stage questions. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the trial stages. Table 2 provides details of 
trial numbers in the task; for details on the full methodology (including sentence matching), 
see Bradford et al. (2015; 2018). 
 
Table 2: Number of trials in each condition combination in the Self/Other Differentiation Task.  












10 10 10 10 10 10 60 
Unexpected 
Contents 
10 10 10 10 10 10 60 






A Repeated-Measures ANOVA with Dilemma Type (Self vs. Other) as a within-subjects factor, 




There was a significant main effect of group on dilemma question accuracy, F (1,59) = 4.36, p 
= .04, ڟp2 = .07, with more accurate responses in the TD group (M = 97.7%) than the ASD group 
(M = 95.8%). There was no significant main effect of dilemma type (p = .71, ڟp2 = .002) and no 
interaction between Dilemma Type and Group (p = .59, ڟp2 = .005). 
 
Response Times 
There was no significant main effect of group (p = .10, ڟp2 = .05), however a significant main 
effect of Dilemma Type, F (1,59) = 48.11, p < .001, ڟp2 = .45, revealed faster responses to Self-
Oriented Dilemmas (M = 1548ms) than to Other-Oriented Dilemmas (M = 1701ms). There was 
no significant interaction between Dilemma Type and Group (p = .42, ڟp2 = .01). 
 
 






A 2 (Perspective Shift: No Shift vs. Shift) x 2 (Contents: Expected vs. Unexpected) x 2 (Probe: 
Self vs. Other) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for accuracy and response times, 
with group (ASD vs. TD) as a between-subjects factor. Table 3 presents the means and 
standard error values for each condition of the Self/Other Differentiation task; Table 4 




There was a significant main effect of group, with more accurate responses in the TD group 
(M = 96.4%) than the ASD group (M = 90.4 %). There was also a significant main effect of 
Probe Type, with more accurate responses to Self-Oriented Probes (M = 94.2%) compared to 
Other-Oriented Probes (M = 92.6%), and a significant main effect of Contents Type, with more 
Table 3: Means and standard error values for each condition of the Self/Other Differentiation Task, 
for accuracy and response times 
     ASD  TD 









No Shift Expected Self  98.3 0.8  99.7 0.8 
  Other  98.6 0.6  99.1 0.6 
 Unexpected Self  82.4 3.7  95 3.5 
  Other  80.7 3.8  91.9 3.6 
Shift Expected Self  99.3 0.5  99.1 0.5 
  Other  97.2 0.8  98.7 0.8 
 Unexpected Self  85.5 3.3  94.7 3.2 














No Shift Expected Self  1152.5 65.1  919.0 61.9 
  Other  1192.5 70.8  953.6 67.4 
 Unexpected Self  1289.0 71.5  1007.1 68.1 
  Other  1355.2 85.6  1074.8 81.5 
Shift Expected Self  1215.6 70.9  952.3 67.4 
  Other  1360.8 84.6  1096.1 80.6 
 Unexpected Self  1270.2 76.4  944.7 72.7 
  Other  1364.1 72.4  1064.2 68.9 
          
BELIEF-ATTRIBUTION IN ADULTS WITH AUTISM 
 
13 
accurate responses to the probe question in Expected Contents trials (M = 98.8%) than 
Unexpected Contents trials (M = 88.1%).  
 
Table 4: Results from the repeated-measures ANOVA for accuracy and response time values 







Group 5.946 1,59 0.018 * 0.092 
Perspective Shift 0.715 1,59 0.401 0.012 
Contents 21.473 1,59 <0.001 *** 0.267 
Probe 6.81 1,59 0.011 * 0.103 
Perspective Shift x Group 0.497 1,59 0.484 0.008 
Perspective Shift x Contents 2.593 1,59 0.113 0.042 
Perspective Shift x Probe 0.248 1,59 0.621 0.004 
Contents x Group 5.213 1,59 0.026 * 0.081 
Contents x Probe 2.075 1,59 0.155 0.034 
Probe x Group 0.212 1,59 0.647 0.004 
Perspective Shift x Contents x Group 0.247 1,59 0.621 0.004 
Perspective Shift x Probe x Group 1.748 1,59 0.191 0.029 
Perspective Shift x Contents x Probe 0.109 1,59 0.742 0.002 
Contents x Probe x Group 0.018 1,59 0.895 <0.001 











Group 9.187 1,59 0.004 ** 0.135 
Perspective Shift 5.892 1,59 0.018 * 0.091 
Contents 7.767 1,59 0.007 ** 0.116 
Probe 29.506 1,59 <0.001 *** 0.333 
Perspective Shift x Group 0.789 1,59 0.378 0.013 
Perspective Shift x Contents 12.089 1,59 0.001 *** 0.17 
Perspective Shift x Probe 3.163 1,59 0.08(*) 0.051 
Contents x Group 0.981 1,59 0.326 0.016 
Contents x Probe 0.013 1,59 0.91 <0.001 
Probe x Group 0.024 1,59 0.878 <0.001 
Perspective Shift x Contents x Group 0.003 1,59 0.959 <0.001 
Perspective Shift x Probe x Group 0.029 1,59 0.866 <0.001 
Perspective Shift x Contents x Probe 0.7 1,59 0.406 0.012 
Contents x Probe x Group 0.056 1,59 0.813 0.001 
Perspective Shift x Contents x Probe x Group 0.015 1,59 0.902 <0.001 
      
These main effects were modulated by a significant interaction between Contents Type and 
Group (see Figure 2). Post-hoc independent samples t-tests with Bonferroni corrections 
showed that when the contents were expected there was no significant difference in accuracy 
between ASD (M = 98.4%) and TD (M = 99.1%) participants, t (59) = 1.38, p = .35, d = .35, but 
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when the contents were unexpected, accuracy was significantly reduced for ASD participants 
(M = 82.5%) compared to TD participants (M = 93.8%), t (59) = 2.38, p = .04, d = .60. 
 










Figure 2: Mean accuracy (percent correct) to the probe question, following                                
expected or unexpected contents revelation. 
 
Response Time 
There was a significant main effect of group, with faster responses from TD participants (M = 
1001ms) than ASD participants (M = 1274ms). There was also a significant main effect of 
Probe Type, with faster responses to Self-Oriented Probes (M = 1093ms) than Other-Oriented 
Probes (M = 1182ms), and a significant main effect of Contents Type, with faster responses in 
Expected Contents trials (M = 1105ms) than Unexpected Contents trials (M = 1171ms). In 
addition, there was a significant main effect of Perspective-Shifting, with faster responses in 
no-perspective shift conditions (M = 1117ms) compared to perspective-shift conditions (M = 
1158ms). 
 
There was a significant interaction between Perspective-Shifting and Contents Type. Post-hoc 
paired samples t-tests, with Bonferroni corrections, revealed that responses were faster for 
Expected than Unexpected contents in no-perspective shift trials (M difference = 126ms), 
t(60)= 4.16, p< .001, d=.32, but did not differ in perspective-shift trials (M difference = 4ms), 
t(60)= .12, p= .91, d=.01. Finally, there was a trend towards a significant interaction between 
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Perspective-Shifting and Probe Type1; post-hoc paired sample t-tests, with Bonferroni 
corrections, revealed that responses were significantly slower for Other-Oriented than Self-
Oriented Probes in Perspective-Shift trials (M difference = 126ms), t(60)= 4.38, p< .001, d=.31, 
and were marginally slower for Other-Oriented than Self-Oriented Probes in No-Perspective 
Shift trials (M difference = 52ms), t(60)= 2.24, p= .058, d=.14. 
 




This study sought to assess whether an explicit test of ToM abilities can reveal distinct belief-
attribution abilities in adults with and without high-functioning ASD. In particular, we 
assessed how efficiently individuals could attribute beliefs to themselves and to other people, 
ĂŶĚ ŚŽǁ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ƐǁŝƚĐŚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ĂŶĚ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ĞůƐĞ ?Ɛ
perspective, as required during everyday social interactions. Using a computerized false-
belief task to assess response times and accuracy, results revealed largely comparable 
outcomes for TD participants and participants with ASD. First, both TD and ASD individuals 
were faster and more accurate ƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘^ĞůĨ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĂŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ?
perspective, suggesting that people experienced an egocentric bias when responding to the 
Probe questions; this egocentric bias was equivalent between the two groups, and the ASD 
participants did not experience greater interference from the self-perspective than TD 
participants. Results also revealed a significant effect of perspective-shifting for both TD and 
ASD individuals, with slower and less accurate responses when a perspective-shift was 
required compared to when no change in perspective was required between the Dilemma 
and Probe stage. Similar to prior studies, participants found it harder to shift from their own 
perspective to that of another person (i.e., shifting from a Self-Oriented Dilemma to an Other-
Oriented Probe), compared to shifting from soŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?
shifting from an Other-Oriented Dilemma to a Self-Oriented Probe within a trial). Contrary to 
our hypotheses however, this pattern was evident for both TD and ASD individuals, suggesting 
                                                      
1 Note that two ASD participants had low overall accuracy scores (M = 48% and 54% accuracy, respectively). 
Analysis of response times and accuracy did not change substantively when these participants were excluded; 
all main effects were replicated, and for response times the Perspective-Shifting x Probe Type interaction 
became significant (rather than a trend), F (1,57) = 11.39, p = .001, ڟp2 = .17. 
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similar engagement styles across the two participant groups and that difficulties in engaging 
in perspective-shifting are not specific to individuals with ASD. These results suggest that 
adults with high-functioning ASD are successfully able to engage ToM abilities (specifically, 
belief-attribution), and do so within a comparable timecourse to TD adults. The current 
findings support recent research that has argued that social difficulties experienced by 
individuals with ASD are not due to an absence of ToM capacities per se (e.g., Deschrijver et 
al., 2016; Schneider et al., 2013; Senju, 2013), although it is noted that the current results are 
interpreted with caution, as they do not tease apart use of ToM capacities themselves versus 
the potential engagement of compensatory strategies that individuals with ASD may be 




Interestingly, despite the core similarities between TD and ASD participants seen in the results 
of this study, some clear differences in explicit ToM processing were revealed between the 
two groups. First, responses were overall slower and less accurate among the ASD individuals 
than the TD individuals, which supports the hypothesized general difficulty in engaging belief-
state attribution capacities among adults with ASD. More importantly, analysis of error rates 
revealed a specific impairment in the ASD group on false-belief trials, with significantly more 
errors in unexpected contents (false-belief) trials compared to expected contents (true-belief) 
trials. That is, when the contents revelation stage showed expected contents (i.e., true-belief 
trials), ASD and TD participants were equally efficient at correctly answering the Probe 
question (98% and 99% accuracy, respectively). However, when the contents revelation stage 
showed unexpected contents (i.e., false-belief trials), ASD participants were significantly less 
accurate than TD participants at correctly answering the Probe question (82% versus 93% 
accuracy). These results indicate that adults with ASD experience a particular impairment with 
utilizing their ToM abilities when two contrasting belief-states need to be held in mind; i.e., 
the outdated belief of what they believed to be inside a container before seeing inside (the 
correct answer to the Probe question) and the reality state of what they know to actually be 
inside a container. Thus, participants with ASD were less able than TD participants to 
spontaneously consider multiple mental states in this task, experiencing more difficulty 
BELIEF-ATTRIBUTION IN ADULTS WITH AUTISM 
 
17 
disengaging from current, reality based belief-states, and suggesting that ToM abilities are 
not utilized as efficiently in individuals with ASD compared to their TD peers.  
 
It is important to note that both TD and ASD participants showed an effect of contents type, 
with more errors in false-belief trials compared to true-belief trials, suggesting that the 
Self/Other Differentiation task successfully manipulated belief-states of participants, and is 
thus a suitable measure for assessing belief-attribution abilities in adult populations. Results 
also showed a significant interaction between Perspective-Shifting and Contents Type for 
response times, indicating that in trials in which no perspective-shift was required (Self-Self, 
Other-Other), participants were faster to respond following expected versus unexpected 
contents, whereas in trials in which a perspective-shift was required (Self-Other, Other-Self), 
there was no significant difference in speed of response between expected/unexpected 
contents trials. This suggests that for both TD and ASD participants, the manipulation of 
contents type (i.e., true vs. false-belief) was particularly salient in no perspective-shift trials, 
compared to trials in which participants are already required to engage in extra cognitive 
processing to switch between perspectives across the Dilemma-to-Probe stages of the task. 
The results of the current study may have implications for predicting the success of social 
interactions in daily life; when engaging in a conversation with someone, the notion of what 
people know or believe can change throughout a conversation, as more information is 
exchanged. Perhaps individuals with ASD have a specific difficulty with tracking these updates 
of mental states under these circumstances, and thus have difficulties contemplating more 
than one mental state at a time, such as a previously held belief state versus current 
knowledge state, in this task. 
 
Socio-cognitive or domain-general cognitive difficulties? 
 
Our results highlight that adults with ASD are successfully able to utilize belief-attribution 
capacities, although in a less efficient way than TD individuals. Importantly, the results 
indicate a particular deficit experienced by ASD participants in accurately processing false-
beliefs, compared to TD participants, likely due to the multiple perspectives that need to be 
considered at one time (i.e., what was previously believed to be inside a container vs. what is 
now known to be in the container). These observed difficulties may be reflective of socio-
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cognitive deficits specifically or more domain-general cognitive difficulties experienced by 
autistic individuals, such as in working memory or cognitive flexibility. Prior research has 
suggested that individuals with ASD experience reduced executive function abilities (e.g., 
Craig et al., 2016; Eylen et al., 2011; Russell, Hala, & Hill, 2003), including inhibition, cognitive 
flexibility, working memory, and planning, which are often cited as being required for 
successful engagement of social cognition capacities (e.g., Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Cane, 
Ferguson, & Apperly, 2017; Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Sabbagh et al., 2006). For 
example, success on a false-belief task requires one to hold in mind multiple perspectives (i.e. 
working memory), suppress irrelevant perspectives (i.e. inhibitory control), and switch 
between these two perspectives depending on context (i.e. cognitive flexibility). In contrast, 
true-beliefs make much lower demands on executive function processes. In the current study, 
participants with ASD made more errors in false-belief trials than in true-belief trials, 
suggesting a particular difficulty in disengaging from current reality based belief-states. 
Future research is needed to examine the degree to which differences in explicit ToM task 
performance between ASD and TD adults can be explained in terms of social communication 
impairments associated with the disorder, or to more general executive functioning deficits 
(e.g., inhibition and cognitive flexibility; Pacherie, 1997; Russell, 1997). 
 
Implicit vs. Explicit Measures 
 
Prior research has highlighted different outcomes from studies that test explicit versus 
implicit expression of ToM abilities. Implicit tasks typically reveal impaired automatic belief 
tracking among ASD participants (e.g., Senju et al., 2009), though TD and ASD individuals tend 
to perform at similar levels on explicit response-based tasks, with both successfully passing 
even complex ToM tasks (Deschrijver et al., 2016; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Roeyers et al., 2001; 
Scheeren et al., 2013). In the current study, participants were required to give an explicit 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŶŐĂŶŝŵĂŐĞƚŚĂƚƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚĂƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇŚĞůĚďĞůŝĞĨƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞ ‘^ĞůĨ ?
Žƌ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƵŶůŝŬĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƚĂƐŬƐthat have assessed explicit ToM abilities in adults 
with ASD, our study allowed examination of the efficiency with which ToM abilities are 
utilized using accuracy and response times as more sensitive measures of ToM tasks 
engagement, rather than simply looking at a binary pass/fail task (e.g., Baez et al., 2012; 
Gantman, Kapp, Orenski, & Laugeson, 2012; Happé, 1994; Schneider et al., 2013). The more 
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sensitive approach taken here therefore demonstrates that overall adults with ASD are able 
to attribute and track beliefs for the self and others in a ToM task, and are sensitive to the 
same biases as TD adults. The current results highlight explicit evidence that managing these 
complex processes is significantly more challenging for people with ASD (reflected in longer 
reaction times and lower accuracy), and is subject to increased interference from conflicting 
mental states. It is noted that at the Dilemma Stage of the Self/Other Differentiation task, 
there was a significant main effect of group on accuracy, with ASD participants overall less 
accurate (95.8% accurate) than TD participants (97.7% accurate); this suggests that, at the 
Dilemma Stage, ASD participants found the scenarios more difficult to engage with than TD 
participants. However, there was no significant interaction between Dilemma Type and 
group, indicating that, despite being overall less accurate at the Dilemma Stage, accuracy of 
ASD participants was not influenced by perspective-type (i.e., they were equally accurate 
across self/other-oriented Dilemma questions), akin to TD participants.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we aimed to assess the efficiency of belief-attribution abilities  W a core 
component of ToM  W in adults with and without ASD, using a computerized false-belief task. 
Results revealed that TD and ASD participants performed comparably when attributing beliefs 
to the self and other, with faster and more accurate responses to Self-Oriented trials 
compared to Other-Oriented trials, and slower responses when a perspective shift was 
required. The results demonstrate a specific deficit for ASD participants in processing false-
beliefs, suggesting increased difficulty disengaging from reality based belief-states than TD 
participants. Impaired ability to consider and track multiple mental states would have 
repercussions on how successfully an individual is able to relate to other people in a social 
setting, and therefore has implications for the quality of social interactions in daily life. Future 
research should explore this further, assessing the extent to which these difficulties reflect a 
purely social impairment, or whether they relate to impairments in more general cognitive 
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